Privacy-Preserving Data Mining -developing models without seeing the data -is receiving growing attention. This paper assumes a privacy-preserving distributed data mining scenario: data sources collaborate to develop a global model, but must not disclose their data to others. Naïve Bayes is often used as a baseline classifier, consistently providing reasonable classification performance. This paper brings privacy-preservation to Naïve Bayes classification on vertically partitioned data.
Introduction.
There is growing concern with the privacy implications of data mining. While data mining usually produces general models rather than knowledge about specific individuals, the process of data mining creates integrated data warehouses that pose real privacy issues. Data that is of limited sensitivity by itself becomes highly sensitive when integrated, and gathering the data under a single roof greatly increases the opportunity for misuse.
Our solution to this problem is to avoid disclosing data beyond its source, while still constructing data mining models equivalent to those that would have been learned on an integrated data set. The definition of privacy is conceptually simple: no site should learn anything new from the process of data mining. Specifically, anything learned during the data mining process must be derivable given one's own data and the final resultnothing is learned about any other site's data that isn't inherently obvious from the data mining result. Since we prove that data is not disclosed beyond its original source, the opportunity for misuse is not increased by the process of data mining. This concept was first proposed for decision trees [8] ; protocols have also been developed for association rules [11, 6] and clustering [12, 7] . Naïve Bayes is a simple but highly effective classifier. This combination of simplicity and effectiveness has lead to its use as a baseline standard by which other classifiers are measured. With various enhancements it is highly effective, and receives practical use in many applications (e.g., text classification [9] ). This * Purdue University paper extends the portfolio of privacy-preserving distributed data mining to include this standard classifier.
The method presented in this paper applies to vertically partitioned data, i.e., each site has a different set of attributes but all reference the same set of entities. For example, assume a medical research study may want to compare medical outcomes based on techniques in pharmaceutical manufacturing processes (e.g., to answer the question "are generic drugs really as effective as brand-name", and more important, what manufacturing processes produce the best results?) The insurance companies can't disclose individual patient data without permission [4] , and complete manufacturing processes are trade secrets (although individual techniques may be commonly known.)
Section 2 gives the model in which the problem is set. We present a protocol for privately learning a Naïve Bayes classifier in Section 3. The proof of the privacy preserving properties of the method is given in Section 4. We conclude with a discussion of future work.
2 Problem Statement. This paper addresses classification over vertically partitioned data: where different sites hold different attributes. One issue of particular interest with classification is the location and security properties of the class attribute. We can divide this into two possibilities:
• All the parties hold the (common/public) class attribute, or
• Only a subset of the parties have the (secret) class attribute.
The first case is the simplest, assuming that the class attribute of the training data is known to all parties. In this case, it is easy to estimate all the required counts for nominal attributes and means and variances for numeric attributes locally, causing no privacy breaches. Prediction can be accomplished by independently estimating the probabilities, and securely multiplying and comparing to obtain the predicted class. More interesting is the general case, where not all parties have the class attribute. We can simplify this to the basic case where one party has the class attribute and the other has the remaining attributes.
It is important that the model learned not reveal information -the model parameters (probability distribution of classes) would reveal information about the (protected) class values. The relative distribution of classes in the training data is likely to be sensitive, as is the mean/variance or distribution of the attribute values. Instead, we build a model where each party has random shares of the model, and collaborate to classify an instance. The only knowledge gained by either side is the class of each instance classified.
Learning the predicted class of enough instances may allow reverse-engineering the classifier, but this is unavoidable given the goal of learning the classes of the test data. A party can prevent further disclosure at any time by disposing of their share of the classifier.
To prove that our Naïve Bayes algorithm preserves privacy, we need to define privacy preservation. We use the framework defined in Secure Multiparty Computation [3] , and several primitives from the Secure Multiparty Computation literature. Assembling these into efficient privacy-preserving data mining algorithms, and proving them secure, is a challenging task. This paper demonstrates how these can be combined to implement a standard data mining algorithm with provable privacy and information disclosure properties.
Privacy Preserving Naive Bayes Classifier.
A complete exposition of the Naïve Bayes algorithm can be found in [9] . We assume that the basic formulae are well known. The basic idea behind our protocol is that each party ends up with shares of the conditionally independent probabilities that constitute the parameters of a Naïve Bayes classifier. By themselves, the shares appear random -only when added do they have meaning. This addition only occurs as part of evaluating the classifier on an instance -and the protocol that does this reveals only the class of the instance.
We must address two issues: How to compute shares of the model parameters, and how to classify a new instance. To compute shares of nominal attributes, the parameters are P (x i |v l ) = n i /n for each class i and attribute value l. For numeric attributes, we need the mean and variance for the probability density function for the Normal distribution. The key idea is that to compute a given entry s li , P d for j = 1 . . . n do 13:
14: end for 21: end for constructs a binary vector corresponding to the entities in the training set with 1 for each item having the value a l and 0 for other items. P c constructs a similar vector with 1/n i for the n i entities in the class, and 0 for other entities. The scalar product of the vectors gives the appropriate probability for the entry.
Protocol 1 defines the protocol to compute the shares of these renormalized ratios (probabilities) in detail. To accomplish the security proof, calculations must occur over a closed field; as a result values are premultiplied by a constant and truncated to integral values. To achieve full precision, this constant should be a multiple of the least common multiple of n 1 , ..., n k , however sharing this would reveal private information about the distribution of classes. (n! would be an acceptable multiple that would not reveal class distributions, but is computationally intractable). In practice, using n on the order of word size (e.g., 2 64 ) will give reasonable precision and computational cost. To simplify presentation, we will speak of "probability" when the algorithm in fact computes C * probability.
Numeric Attributes
For numeric attributes, computing the probability requires knowing the mean µ and variance σ 2 for each class value. Computing the mean is similar to the preceding algorithm -for each class, P c builds a vector of 1/n i and 0 depending on whether the training entity is in the class or not. The mean for the class is the scalar product of this vector with the projection of the data onto the attribute. The scalar product gives each party a share of the result, such that the sum is the mean (multipled by a constant, to convert to an integral value.)
Computing the variances σ 
In the next phase (lines 23-31), P c takes the data values and subtracts the means (both its share and the share sent by P d ) to get the distance needed to compute the variance. P c also subtracts a random value, keeping the random value as its share of the distances. Homomorphic encryption (E(a + b) = E(a) * E(b)) makes this possible without decrypting. It now sends the vector back to P d , which can decrypt to get the distance minus a random value.
The parties now engage in a square computation protocol to compute shares t j , t j of the square of the sum of P c 's randoms r j and the decrypted distance. Square computation can be done using oblivious polynomial evaluation [10] . The scalar product of P d 's share vector and the class vector Y is taken, giving two shares. To its share, P c adds the scalar product of its vector of randoms and Y . This gives each party a share of σ 2 multiplied by the probability of an item appearing in the class (again scaled to an integral value, in this case by the cube of the chosen constant.)
Evaluation
The class of a new instance is predicted as follows:
Since both y = x 2 and y = ln x are monotonically increasing functions, squaring and taking the natural log still preserves the correctness of the argmax. Thus the equation can be rewritten as follows: Generate random r j 26:
33: for j = 1 . . . n do
34:
Shares t j , t j ← (r j + w j ) 2 using a protocol for square computation 35: end for 36: for i = 1 . . . k do
37:
{ Y is vector for class k as generated in steps 1-5}
38:
Compute shares temp, σ j where temp + σ j = T · Y 39:
where the constant C is determined by the number and composition of the nominal attributes. If there are l nominal attributes, C = Const 1 * . . . * Const l where each Const i is the constant that the nominal probability of attribute i was multiplied by. Taking the logarithm converts the constant multiplicative factor into a constant additive factor. For a nominal attribute,
We have already shown how to compute p and p in Section 3.1. The parties can computes shares of the ln function securely using the secure ln method developed by Lindell and Pinkas [8] . Finally, they multiply their shares by 2 to generate the necessary shares.
For a numeric attribute,
Shares of σ 2 are present with both parties. Shares of ln(σ 2 ) can again be computed using Lindell's method [8] . Shares of (x − µ) 2 can be computed using the square computation method. Finally, shares of (x − µ 2 )/σ 2 can be computed using an extension of the division protocol of Du and Atallah [1] . Thus, for every class value and attribute, the shares of the required values are divided between the parties owning the attribute and the class attribute. Evaluating equation 3.2 is accomplished through secure circuit evaluation as in the Secure Add and Compare circuit used in [12] , returning only the class label of the maximal class.
Proof of Security
We now give a proof of security for protocols of Section 3. The composition theorem [3] allows us to use existing secure protocols as components, worrying only that their results do not reveal anything. We start with a lemma that share splitting does in fact preserve privacy. Lemma 4.1. If a function y = f (x 1 + x 2 ) is evaluated over a finite field F, where the inputs x 1 and x 2 are shares known to two different parties and the output y is also split into shares, where the share y 1 is chosen randomly from an uniform distribution over the field F and y 2 = y − y 1 , then both parties can independently simulate their share y i .
Proof. We first show that P (y 2 = a) =
This is equivalent to choosing y 2 from an uniform distribution over the field F. Although the joint distribution of y 1 , y 2 is not necessarily uniform, independently both y 1 and y 2 can be simulated using a uniform distribution. Proof. We prove the protocol secure by providing a simulator for the views of parties P c and P d ; the messages they receive during an execution of the protocol (only lines 10, 22, 30, 34, and 38). At line 10, the results of the scalar product protocol are random shares, which can be simulated by both P c and P d as shown in Lemma 4.1.
At line 22, P c simulates the message received by generating a key pair and using the generated encryption key for E k . It generates n random numbers to comprise D e and k random numbers to form M e . Assuming security of encryption, these are computationally indistinguishable from the true vectors and encryption key.
To simulate the message received by P d at line 30, P d chooses n random numbers from an uniform distribution over the field F and encrypts these numbers with its key E k to form the vector Z. Note that each z j simulates the encryption of Const * (d j − µ cj ) − r j . Since the operations are over a finite field F and the r j is also uniformly chosen over the finite field F,
Thus simulating the value is possible by choosing a random number from an uniform distribution over F and encrypting this random with E k . At lines 34 and 38, the results of the square computation and scalar product are random shares, simulated by both P c and P d as shown in Lemma 4.1.
Note that the scalar product in line 39 is a completely local computation by P c and thus does not need to be simulated by P d . Protocol 2 can thus be simulated, with the composition theorem being applied to the scalar product protocol at lines 10 and 38 and to the square computation protocol at line 34. Proof. For nominal attributes, the shares of the probabilities are present with both the parties to begin with. The secure ln computation returns random shares to both the parties. By Lemma 4.1, these shares can be independently simulated by both the parties.
For numeric attributes, shares of the means and variances are present with both the parties. The secure ln computation returns random shares of the variance to both the parties, which can be independently simulated. The call to the secure square computation protocol also returns random shares of (x − µ) 2 . Finally, the division protocol computes random shares of (x − µ) 2 /σ 2 . By Lemma 4.1 all these shares can be independently simulated by both the parties.
The addition and comparison circuit is a generic circuit, proven secure in [2] . The result is simply the output class, and is simulated exactly as the final result is presumed known by the simulator. Applying the composition theorem to the secure ln computation, protocol 1, protocol 2, and the square computation protocol, the evaluation protocol is also secure.
Conclusion.
Often, when legal/commercial reasons restrict sharing data, it may be imprudent to share models generated from the data. We have presented a method that bypasses this restriction.
Space restrictions preclude a detailed analysis of the communication cost. For nominal attributes, assuming k classes and r values for the attributes, protocol 1 is O(rkn); this is reasonable for small values of r and k (where Naïve Bayes is most effective), while building the tree for numeric attributes is O(kn). Evaluating the tree requires an operation for each attribute, where the operations are constant (although non-trivial, dominated by the cost of the Secure ln protocol). Future work will address the practical cost of this method, using tools such as hardware cryptographic accelerators. This paper is based on the semi-honest model. While the components can be extended to the malicious model, doing so efficiently is an interesting research problem. In general, the efficiency of privacy-preserving protocols is open -most are significantly more expensive than non-privacy-preserving protocols for the same problem. Progress in this area will enable application of data mining to opportunities that are currently unexplored due to privacy and security concerns.
